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GLOSSARY

Data breach: An impermissible use or disclosure under the HIPAA Privacy Rule that
compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information (HHS,
2014).
Electronic Health Records: Go beyond the data provided by the collector's office and
include a more comprehensive patient history. They are designed to contain and
share information from all providers involved in a patient's care. They can be
created, managed, consulted and consumed by authorized providers and staff from
across more than one health care organization (HealthIT.gov, 2014).
Electronic Medical Records: A digital version of a paper chart that contains all of a
patient's medical history from one practice. It is mostly used by providers for
diagnosis and treatment (HealthIT.gov, 2014).
HIPAA: HIPAA is an acronym for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act that was passed by Congress in 1996. HIPAA does the following: provides
the ability to transfer and continue health insurance coverage for millions of
American workers and their families when they change or lose their jobs
(HHS.gov, 2014).
HITECH: HITECH stands for Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health. The provisions of the HITECH Act are specifically designed to work
together to provide the necessary assistance and technical support to providers,
enable coordination and alignment within and among states, establish connectivity
to the public health community in case of emergencies, and assure the workforce
is properly trained and equipped to be meaning users of certified Electronic
Health Records (HealthIT, 2014).
Medical Identity Theft: The fraudulent use of an individual's identifying information in a
health care setting to fraudulently obtain medical services, prescription drugs or
goods, including attempts to commit fraudulent billing, or for financial gain
(Ponemon, 2013).
Provider: A provider of medical or health services, or any other organization who
furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business
(HIPAA, 2014).

viii

Social engineering: Non-technical intrusions that rely on human interaction and often
involves tricking other people to break normal security procedures.
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ABSTRACT

Fowler, Susan, Marie. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. Measuring the correlation
between risk knowledge and comfort utilizing online medical data. Major Professor:
Marcus Rogers.

This study explores the relationship between a person's knowledge of risk and their
behavior with their use of online medical information. Medical information is gathered
and recorded with a variety of methods and stored in a multitude of locations. Laws exist,
however, breaches and leakages of medical data occur, typically through loss or theft.
Lost and stolen medical information has potentially numerous nefarious purposes
including medical identity theft. Medically identifying information can be made more
vulnerable through careless use and oversight by both medical entities and consumers.
While a person may be knowledgeable or aware of information security risk concepts,
principles or practices, does knowledge of information security risk have a correlation to
how comfortable a person is when using online medical data?
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Electronic medical records are an evolving industry, with issues such as
regulations, access controls, training and policies requiring attention and resolution. At
stake is consumer privacy and protection from issues such as theft, data breaches, loss,
inaccuracies, exposure of personal data and medical identity theft. Electronic medical
records are found at insurance companies, clinics, hospitals, employers and government
agencies as well as the network that transmits them and ultimately stores them. This
creates concerns for the integrity of electronic medical records and the handling of these
records during their lifecycle as sensitive data can be viewed, accessed or compromised
during collection, transmission and storage. Access to these records through these points
in the electronic lifecycle can compromise data integrity or result in exposure or theft.

1.1 Problem Statement

Choosing to use electronic medical records spans a wide cross section, from those
with little to no knowledge of the potential risk, to highly skilled users aware of the
inherent risk. Does this knowledge of risk have an association to how comfortable a
person is using online medical information?
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1.2 Scope

The scope of this paper was a study of individuals that measures how their
knowledge of risk influences their comfort level when using online electronic medical
records. The survey was a convenience sampling of at least 385 adults. The goal was to
get as large of a cross section of adults as possible to participate. While convenience
sampling allows for quick data analysis and theory formation, the chance for bias is
greater than with other sampling types. The measures were twofold: first a measure of the
individual's knowledge of risk and then a measure of their comfort level when using
online medical records. The measure of risk knowledge was classified by the level of
knowledge. These results were then compared to determine if there was then any
correlation on their attitudes toward electronic medical record use.

1.3 Significance of the Problem

Medical data leakages and breaches can take a variety of forms that may
compromise a variety of data. Some of these include personally identifiable patient or
employee information and business related information such as financial or marketing
data. Breaches can result from theft and losses of laptops, breached servers or simply
unattended files.
The Ponemon Institute (2013) reports that instances of medical identity theft
are on the rise, from 1.4 million people in 2010 to 1.85 million in 2012. It is
conservatively estimated that 3-10 percent of all health care related expenditures in 2012
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were fraud related (Ponemon, 2013). The resulting consequences of these data leakages
and breaches vary for the patient. A patient may be responsible for fraudulent changes for
treatment obtained under the patient's identity, which can then result in service limit
restrictions on an insurance policy. They may face incorrect information in a patient
record, potentially threatening the health or life of a patient or negatively impacting
medical decisions made with that data (Taitsman, Grimm, & Agrawal, 2013).
Providers can shoulder the burden of illegal activity from fraudulent or
exaggerated billing, assuming these are paid on behalf of legitimate patient activity.
When the criminal activity is discovered, the patient may then be left with unpaid service
bills. Insurance companies covering fraudulent services or products may pass these along
the form of increased premiums and copayments.
Up to 10 percent of health payments paid through Medicare and Medicaid are
reportedly due to criminal activity. This includes medical identity theft and corrupt health
care providers. Total fraudulent expenditures range from three to ten percent, which
translates to hundreds of billions of dollars (Ponemon, 2013).
When Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries are compromised, taxpayers are left
with the financial burden. It is estimated that over 300,000 accounts may currently be
compromised and are monitored by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(Taitsman et al, 2013).
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1.4 Statement of Purpose

The goal of this study was to determine if a correlation exists between
respondents' knowledge of information security risks and their comfort in using online
medical data. The survey was a convenience sampling of at least 385 adults. The goal
was to get as large of a cross section of adults as possible to participate to measure not
only if there is a correlation between the two variables but if age or gender further plays a
part in the correlation. The measures were twofold: first a measure of the individual's
knowledge of risk, then a measure of their attitudes toward electronic medical record use.
The measure of risk was classified by level, from low to high levels of information
security knowledge. The comfort levels of online medical record use were classified from
very uncomfortable to very comfortable. These levels of knowledge were then compared
to determine if there was then any correlation between information security risk
knowledge and the comfort levels toward electronic medical record use. The hypothesis
was that those who score higher in risk analysis knowledge would report less comfort
when using online medical systems. The analyses examined the correlation between the
two variables and determined which direction these may take, whether it was a positive
or negative correlation. Ideally, the analysis was to further determine any correlations
between age and gender of the respondents and how their responses may differ with other
age brackets or gender
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1.5 Research Question

The research question central to this research asks whether a person's level of
information security risk has a correlation to their comfort level when using online
medical records.

1.6 Assumptions

The following assumptions were inherent to this study:
1. The need exists for a demonstration of a person's perception of risk in
relation to their behavior with medically identifying data.
2. Participants will provide truthful answers to survey questions.
3. The survey questions are designed to gain straightforward, clear responses
4. without giving direction or suggestion of estimated outcomes.
5. Respondents are proficient on how to use and navigate the Internet.

1.7 Delimitations

The delimitations of this study include:
1. The nature of this research may review only a portion of a respondent's
knowledge of risk analysis.
2. The only factors in this study are age and gender.
3. The survey is limited to those who receive the invitation to participate.
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1.8 Limitations

The limitations inherent to this study include:
1.

The survey was a convenience survey over the Internet and attempted to
encompass roughly 385 participants.

2.

There may have been some respondents who failed to complete the
survey or did not follow proper instructions.

3.

The research was a two-part survey where one part may have impacted an
answer or perception of a question given on the next part of the survey.

4.

The response rate for a convenience sample may not be large, which can
increase non-response bias.

1.9 Summary

This chapter has described the motivations for this study. It has presented the
scope, significance of the problem, and the research question. It also described a list of
assumptions, delimitations and limitations. The next chapter discusses the current
relevant literature covering risks associated with medically identifying information and
the ways it can be misused and exploited throughout its lifecycle.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In recent years, medical record organization, storage and use has transitioned to
electronic formats from paper-based methods. There are many benefits to this transition.
Fernandez-Aleman, Senor, Lozoya (2013) point out that electronic records can be
cheaper to administer, can reduce overall costs, improves the quality of care and
encourage more efficient record keeping and mobility. Security and privacy of these
electronic health records has evolved with the threats of exploitation, which includes
medical identity theft. The various cascading effects, including personal health, financial
wellbeing, provider and public health concerns, will be discussed. How a person's
knowledge of risk impacts their choice and quantity of information they provide and how
they interact with electronic medical information will be presented as well.

2.1 Government Regulations

The Federal government has introduced legislation to implement and regulate
electronic medical record use and is pushing to create a national network of electronic
health records by 2014. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
of 1996 established a framework for privacy and security that requires
compliance in transmission and disclosure of certain patient data (Taitsman, Grimm &
Agrawal, 2013). It specifically deals with healthcare coverage situations, such as a
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worker changing or losing their job, as well as standards for electronic transmission of
personally identifiable healthcare information (Camp & Johnson, 2013). The Privacy and
Security Rules within HIPAA deal with ensuring that participating parties operate under
standardized administrative safeguards such as policies and procedures as well as
physical and data structure access control and integrity (Camp & Johnson, 2013).
The purpose behind the creation of the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) was to give structure to protecting medical
identity security and privacy. It builds on HIPAA by notifying consumers of breaches of
HIPAA-covered information holders or third party vendors (Taitsman et al., 2013). It was
created as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to press for the
development and implementation of electronic medical record framework as well as
offering lucrative incentives to hospitals and practitioners to adopt electronic medical
records. In addition, it extends the HIPAA breach notification requirements to covered
business associates as well as introducing new consequences for non-compliance.
The Department of Health and Human Services implemented requirements of
secured and unsecured health care data after HITECH was passed 2009. It specifically
requires encryption of electronic health care records, with practitioners destroying
unencrypted data after it is used. This requirement also extends to HIPAA covered
entities and their business partners. HITECH also increased fines under HIPAA (Camp &
Johnson, 2013). Ironically, HIPAA can restrict resolving medical identity theft as the
perpetrator's information can be protected under the law, thus restricting the disclosure to
the victim who may have this information in their own health record.
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Fernandez-Aleman et al., (2013) make the point that while there has been much
movement toward implementing electronic records, there has been comparatively little
activity toward developing policies that address the emerging issues surrounding their use.
They discuss how there exists a variety of access points to a patient's records by a variety
of staff or facilities. A patient's record may be accessible from multiple facilities and
therefore, vulnerable to a variety of different system security policies and procedures
(Fernandez-Aleman et al., 2013).

2.2 Risks to Consumers

According to the Ponemon Institute study (2013), it is estimated that medical data
breaches cost $6.5 billion to the health care industry; while the FBI (2012) estimates that
health care fraud costs the U.S. economy upwards of $80 billion. The majority of medical
identity theft survey participants do not understand the costs, risks and consequences to
consumers. These risks can take the form of inaccurate information in a medical file,
which can then result in incorrect diagnoses, prescriptions or treatment delays (Ponemon,
2013). They also do not understand the implications of sharing medical credentials or
how to reduce their chances of financial or medical consequences.
Ponemon (2013) also reported that the most common cause of data loss is due to
employee carelessness in the form of lost or stolen laptops or mobile devices.
Correspondingly, criminal attacks have also risen from 20 percent in 2012 to over 33
percent in 2013 (Ponemon, 2013). They also report that the data most often stolen are
medical files, followed by billing and insurance records. Many organizations also allow
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employees to use their own mobile devices to connect to health care facility networks.
Ponemon (2013) reports that an average of 50 percent of employees bring their mobile
devices into health care facilities with an average of 81 percent of the facilities permitting
this use. In light of these statistics, the report that only one-third of facilities are equipped
to detect medical identity theft is especially concerning (Ponemon, 2013).
The black market value of stolen medical data is estimated to be higher than that
of social security numbers. Gordon (2013) reports that medical identities are traded at a
rate 20 to 50 times higher than that of financial identities (Gordon, 2013). As financial
identity theft risks and prevention have become more prominent, consumers are educated
on how to protect their sensitive data, such as social security number. This is generally
not so with medically identifying data; therefore people may be less careful guarding its
privacy (Gordon, 2013).
In addition to financial concerns, safety and quality of care concerns exist with
medical identity theft. Taitsman et al., (2013) points out that incorrect information in a
patient's record can affect any decision making on the patient's behalf. People have been
incorrectly diagnosed with HIV or diabetes when those with the real ailment sought care
under the victim's name. Pharmacists or medical care suppliers have also rejected claims
for needed medical equipment or prescriptions when it was shown to have already been
obtained by the fraudulent party (Taitsman et al., 2013).
Researchers Levy and Royne (2009) present their findings of how HIPAA can be
circumvented, which can allow patient data to be viewed or exploited. They explain how
health care entities can release patient data to insurance companies or third party payers.
While HIPAA protects patient data as it travels electronically, this data can be used to
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focus in on specific patients for marketing purposes or to address health care needs for
certain conditions. Patients may give this authorization within the context of privacy
agreements and not have a complete understanding to what they are ultimately agreeing.
These types of disclosures can take the form of appointment reminders, health-related
events, notifications of care options and even fundraising activities. These electronic
transactions can expose a patient's data during the preparation and transmission stages
(Levy & Royne, 2009).
Levy and Royne (2009) further discuss how a patient may be unaware that they
must specifically opt out of some situational marketing strategies. Unless this option is
chosen, their identifying information, such as name, age, and other data not related to the
specific medical condition may be included in fundraising or marketing campaigns. Levy
and Royne (2009) state that patients may not even be aware of how their information
migrated to these marketing lists.
Insurance companies and their practices are also discussed by Levy and Royne
(2009). They point out that medical information gathered during employment is not
covered by HIPAA, nor is medical information, such as specific conditions, prescriptions
and referrals, residing in the school records of children. Even if marketing is not the goal
of the schools, it may be transferred or given to organizations that use it for that purpose
(Levy & Royne, 2009).
Levy and Royne (2009) point out community health screenings, such as
cholesterol checks and blood screenings that may be found in shopping centers or
pharmacies, are additional vulnerable access points to patient records. These can draw
large crowds as they offer free or low cost screenings that are convenient for consumers.
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The data collected from these screenings can be used for targeted marketing campaigns.
The authors point out that the patients may be especially vulnerable to compromise as
they may not be able to afford to visit a doctor or other health care facility (Levy &
Royne, 2009).
Other areas of concern include Internet surveys or services that can exploit those
who are trying to get medical advice or help online. People may complete these surveys
to get free coupons and may end up on a marketer's mailing list. These types of surveys
are especially effective as few users read the privacy policies on websites (Levy & Royne,
2009).

2.3 Number of People Affected

The Ponemon Institute (2013) states that about nine percent of the United States
adult population of adults have been victims of identity fraud, with six percent of those
victims of medical identity theft. This number translates to approximately 1.85 million
people. The Department of Health and Human Services (2012) report that between the
end of 2009 and the end of 2011, over 13,000 Medicare and Medicaid participants had
their medical data breached. They reported to Congress in 2010 that over 5 million
people were affected by large breaches of over 500 members at each occurrence.
Kierkegaard (2012) states that there were over 375 breaches resulting in almost eight
million records compromised and exposed. This figure does not reflect smaller breaches
of less than 500 records as it is not required under HIPAA (Kierkegaard, 2012).
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2.4 Types of Liability

Various types of liability can occur with medical identify theft. Gordon (2013)
describes how the impact of medical identity theft can be more complex than that of
financial crime. A patient may be denied care or health insurance, turned down for a job
based on inaccurate medical records or put in collections for bills rendered in their name.
Taitsman et al, (2013) discusses how a patient may not only face financial issues from
fraudulently obtained medical services but may be impacted by exhausted benefit limits if
they must seek medical treatment for themselves (Taitsman et al., 2013). Mancilla and
Moczygemba (2009) point out that in addition to personal damage, legal, financial and
public image costs may occur at the organizational level, such as a health entity failing to
perform due diligence to prevent medical identity theft.

2.5 Types of Breaches

Mancilla and Moczygemba (2009) suggest that growing numbers of healthcare
workers are involved directly or indirectly in health care fraud either by committing it or
allowing it to happen. They present their findings from a study that explored admitting
and registration practices used by acute health care entities to suggest standards that may
help to identify and reduce medical identity theft. They found that most medical identity
theft occurrences happen in the emergency departments, as drug seeking individuals may
try to hide their identity from authorities for other criminal activities. As many urgent
care facilities do require a form of identification, the authors found that emergency
department workers are unskilled in detecting falsified documents and to make matters
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more difficult , photo identification storage is likely to be fragmented in larger healthcare
systems, if it present at all. Additionally, they state that timing issues during the
admission process may impact the adherence to organizational policies in place to curb
medical identity theft (Mancilla & Moczygemba, 2009).
Mancilla and Moczygemba (2009) suggest mitigations from their study, which
include addressing the challenges and time constraints of those in the admitting process,
specifically in emergency departments. They state that training and compliance measures
need to be in place for admitting and registration departments. They suggest
implementing medical identity theft identification and training as part of new employee
processes as well as periodic retraining programs. Additionally, they discuss presenting
information to consumers at the point of care. Their findings that emergency rooms
generate a large portion of medical identity theft occurrences suggests that emergency
and acute healthcare providers should educate consumers as they take measures to
educate staff and implement medical identify theft policies and procedures (Mancilla &
Moczygemba, 2009).
Consumers are not the only victims of impersonation or theft, physicians can be
impacted as well. Agrawal and Budetti (2012) discuss physician identity theft and how
identifying information such as National Provider Identifier (NPI) or Tax Identification
Number (TIN) can be assumed or stolen. They report that over 12,000 cases of this type
of compromise were reported to the FTC between 2007-2009. They discuss two general
methods for this type of compromise: ordering or referring a patient for service or
equipment or billing directly under the physician's name. Actual services may not be
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rendered in either situation. In addition, false facilities may be set up using compromised
or stolen physician credentials (Agrawal & Budetti, 2012).
Risk factors for this type of fraud are primarily through complicity on the part of
the physician. Agrawal and Budetti (2012) report that those who allow the misuse of their
indentifying information are at an exponentially greater risk of theft. This category of
misuse accounts for a small percentage of fraud. They report other risk factors including
the public use of the NPI as an identifier by health care facilities. The large numbers of
health care entities the physician may need to make their NPI available to also increases
the potential for fraud. These organizations may make them available to staff or multiple
organizations they may be involved with, dramatically increasing the visibility or
vulnerability of their information (Agrawal & Budetti, 2012).
Even with policies and procedures in place, the human factor comes into play in a
range of ways that can compromise patient data security. Electronic eavesdropping
happens when patient data is transmitted over an unsecured wireless network. Anyone
within range of the network can capture unencrypted patient data with a laptop computer
(Taitsman et al., 2013). Health care workers can further obstruct security efforts by
neglecting to sign off a system session or multiple sessions on computers or devices out
of their vision. Portable or home-based health care devices compound these issues
(Taitsman et al., 2013).
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2.6 Mitigation

The FTC (2012) recommends reviewing Medicare summary notices, explanations
of benefits and credit reports for signs of inaccurate or fraudulent information. Some of
the areas to scrutinize include dates of service, duplicate billing, collection notices, and
charges for unneeded or unperformed services. In addition, shredding all identifying
documents before disposal as well as destroying any identifying information on
prescription bottles is recommended (FTC, 2012). When visiting websites that host
patient or insurance websites, consumers should access the privacy policies that will
specify how information is collected, shared, who may have access to it and how it is
stored. Consumers should also look for features that indicate the website is secure, such
as the 'https' at the beginning of an URL. The FTC also recommends obtaining a copy of
their medical records, which requires collection from each health care provider as there is
no common source for records. Consumers must be given a written reason if their
requests are denied (FTC, 2010).
The Department of Health and Human Services (2012) suggests guarding
Medicare and social security cards as well as using caution toward anyone offering free
medical services who may request these methods of identification. They further stress
avoiding those who solicit identifying information over the phone or internet, and to
refuse to lend their identifying information to anyone (HHS, 2012). Taitsman et al., (2013)
stresses best care practices to ensure computer and network security concerning patient
care. Since there is no national framework for electronic health information, they
advocate strong passwords, firewalls, antivirus programming and strong security
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protocols (Taitsman et al., 2013). In addition, they discuss risks in hospital and health
care settings, such as failing to log out of username accounts, and the importance of
maintaining security and privacy protocols on mobile devices and laptops (Taitsman et al.,
2013).
Social engineering is also a risk with identifying health information. Taitsman et
al., (2013) discuss social engineering used against patients and hospital staff to gain
access to patient information. Perpetrators may call a doctor's office or health care facility
posing as referring physicians, pharmacies, vendors or insurance companies. They stress
the importance of educating staff to verify the caller's identity and only release necessary
information. They describe how patients should be educated on privacy concerns to help
them reduce their chances of becoming an identity theft victim. A key point is how
insurers can help in the reduction of identity theft by educating consumers on the
importance of reviewing their explanations of benefits. These documents should be sent
when procedures are performed. A caveat here is that many state Medicaid programs do
not routinely send these documents, preventing early detection for this segment of
patients (Taitsman et al., 2013).
Agrawal and Budetti (2012) also advocate involving patients in reviewing
medical documentation to ensure against medical and physician identity theft. They
discuss physician vigilance when beginning or ending a business relationship with health
care entities and monitoring billings under their name (Agrawal & Budetti, 2012).
Fernandez-Aleman (2013) discuss their review of articles focusing on medical record
security and privacy. Their findings show that there are common recommendations across
the board for regulating the flow and control of health care data. The largest consensus
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of security techniques centered around digital signatures with public key infrastructure
and passwords combined with the public key infrastructure. Some interesting findings
show the necessity to override policies in the case of emergency and the relative lack of
articles that stress the importance of health care staff or system users training on security
and privacy issues and policies. Other findings show audit logs are advocated by a
majority of articles (Fernandez-Aleman, 2013).
The Medical Identity Fraud Alliance was created to address some of these issues.
Compromised of representatives from stakeholders across the healthcare spectrum, the
Alliance is designed to develop awareness and education for both the public and
healthcare sectors by developing standards and practices to detect and prevent medical
identity theft through a public, private sector partnership (Gordon, 2013).
The Affordable Care Act adds some additional safeguards for Medicare and
Medicaid programs. The new policies provide:
• A strict screening process for participant categories that have a pattern of
fraudulent activity.
• New policy that States will have to examine service providers that refer
provide Medicaid recipients for histories of fraudulent activity. Any service
provider already banned from another State's Medicare or Medicaid
program will be banned from all State's Medicare and Medicaid programs.
• Using predictive software to detect patterns or areas of fraudulent activity so
that enrollment in that area may be stopped or examined on a closer level.
• Stops payments on a temporary basis in cases of suspected fraudulent
activity by service providers and suppliers. The new policies allow halted
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payment activity while an investigation is undertaken (Agrawal & Burdetti,
2011).

2.7 Risk Knowledge and Online Risk Taking Behavior

Some of the previous research into information security knowledge and risk
taking behavior discusses perceived risk and the factors that influence these perceptions
and how trust can affect consumers purchasing habits and banking behaviors. The two
main areas of risk are losing money during , or as a result of, a transaction and the threat
of losing privacy or private information (Belada, Jong, & Steehouder, 2010).
Kim, Ferrin, & Rao (2007) discuss how findings have been shown that consumers
are reluctant to make purchases from a website unless they trust the merchant. The
authors define online consumer trust as a consumer's subjective belief that the selling
party or entity will fulfill its transactional obligations as the consumer understands them.
They then state than cyber transactions can magnify this effect through characteristics of
Internet commerce, such as being instantaneous, somewhat anonymous and impersonal.
They stress that consumers focus much of their trust on the transactional process rather
than the face-to-face personal relationship of brick and mortar entities can provide.
Creating an online environment of trust and comfort is a key component to ensuring
successful ecommerce (Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2007).
Kim et al (2007) continue to discuss how a consumer's perceived risk combines
with the perceived negative or beneficial effects when making purchasing decisions
requiring trust. The perception of risk is defined by the authors as a consumer's belief
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about the potential uncertain negative outcomes from the online transaction. Beldad, Jong
& Steehouder (2010) point out that differences exist in offline versus online entities.
Offline entities only require trust on the seller or company, whereas an online transaction
requires the consumer to not only trust the website but the organization behind the
website, typically also with an explanation or demonstration of how the site is
trustworthy (Beldad, Jong, & Steehouder, 2010).
Metzger (2006) describes consumer level of trust and risk perception to their level
of Internet online experience. Beldad et al (2006) theorizes from this study that those
with high levels of experience with Internet and computer usage have low risk
perceptions and expectations with online entities and transactions. Aiken and Bousch
(2006) conducted a study that indicated this correlation between novice and intermediate
Internet and computer users but not so in the case of intermediate to expert Internet and
computer users. They describe these findings as an inverted U, where a person's level of
trust increases in the beginning stages of Internet and computer experience but reduces as
their level of experience and knowledge with vulnerabilities expands to show all the
possible risks, which magnifies security and privacy questions.
Accenture (2014) performed a survey to measure how the ability to access
medical records online overshadows the privacy invasion risk. They found that 51% of
patients with chronic conditions were more uneasy about shopping and banking privacy
concerns than those dealing with healthcare information. The survey found that those
with chronic conditions (69%) believed that access to all of their patient records was their
right rather than a privilege. Almost one in five of these patients trusted that their records
were accurate and therefore didn't feel the need to access them, while half did not know
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how to access them. Perera, Holbrook, Thabane, Foster & Willison (2011) reinforced this
finding with their survey of patients and physicians on patient online health records. They
found that 58% of patients and 70% of physicians believed that benefits of computerized
health records outweighed the potential loss of confidentiality and privacy.

2.8 Summary

Electronic medical records continue to expand and evolve. The policies and
procedures meant to regulate their use according to current laws struggle to address the
ever changing methods of breaches and exploitation. While several federal laws exist to
give a framework to security policies and procedures, lack of appropriate employee
behavior has a direct effect on this statistic. Electronic medical record theft can lead to
identity theft and medical identity theft, which can not only cost consumers and providers
large sums of money, but can result in injury or death of the patient and liability issues
for the providers. The largest area of mitigation is education, of both the consumer and
provider, on the prevalence of medical identity theft and risks that can be detected and
reduced in the various levels of the data lifecycle. The motivation of this study is to
determine a consumer's knowledge of these risks in the medical record lifecycle and if
there is any relationship to the way they then use their medically identifying information.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLODY

The goal of this thesis was to discover if a correlation existed between a person's
knowledge of information security risk and their comfort level utilizing medical data
online. To determine if this correlation existed, a two-part survey was used to first
determine a user's knowledge of risk and the second to assess their comfort when using
medical data online. An Internet survey of closed, fixed choice questions was used to
gather this information. A comparative analysis was then performed to determine if there
was indeed a correlation between the two variables and if so, the direction it may lean.

3.1 Hypothesis

The study in this thesis used the following hypotheses to assess if this correlation exists:
Hα: There is a correlation between a person's information security risk
knowledge and their comfort utilizing online medical data.
Ho: There is no significant correlation between a person's information security
risk knowledge and their comfort utilizing online medical data.
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3.2 Study Design

A descriptive survey design, was used (see Appendix). The survey consisted of
two parts: the first determined a user's knowledge of information security risk areas based
on answers to 19 closed ended questions with five answer choices ranging from very
unlikely to very likely. The second part assessed a user's comfort level using medically
identifying data online by answering 13 closed ended questions with seven answer
choices ranging from extremely uncomfortable to extremely comfortable.

3.3 Research Type

The purpose of this study was to determine if there was a correlation between the
two variables, which were a person's information security risk knowledge and their
comfort using online medical records, and if so, the potential direction of that relationship.
Acorrelation analysis was performed to determine if this relationship existed among the
variables. Correlation measures the association between two variables. Regression
examines a relationship between a dependent and independent variable. Correlation and
regression cannot determine a cause and effect relationship, it was used to demonstrate
how and to what extent the variables may be associated with one another. Correlation
analysis assumes that this study was using interval levels to measure the variables, that
there was a linear relationship between the two variables, there were no significant
outliers, and the variables are approximately normally distributed. A frequency analysis
was used to determine the number of missing or nonresponses, outliers and the central
tendency, variability and shape of the distribution.
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3.4 Framework

A descriptive method using Internet surveys was conducted. These surveys were
posted among various research-centered groups as well as on University reciprocal user
groups. The purpose was to reach as large of a cross section of Internet users as possible
to gain an understanding of relationships between and among various demographic and
geographic populations.

3.5 Participants

Internet users were surveyed, with a focus on multiple research centered groups as
well as those with which the University has reciprocal research agreements. Qualtrics
was used to prepare, distribute and gather the surveys. The goal was to try to reach as
large of a cross section of participants as possible with cross sections of various age and
geographic participants. Qualtrics allowed anonymous surveys that do not track
participant identifying information. The response rate was the extent to which the final
data set includes all participants. The equation was the number of participants with whom
surveys were completed divided by the total number of participants in the entire
participating group including non-responders. The lower the response rate, the greater the
sample bias potential becomes.
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3.6 Sampling Approach

An Internet based questionnaire was used. The benefits of low cost and
accessibility made the Internet a good choice for convenience sampling. It was
administered in a non-probability approach in that it was advertised through the described
channels and left to the user to choose to participate. This did not allow the researcher to
determine any type of non-response bias. Recruitment for the convenience sample was
through Purdue alumni chapters, primarily through social media. A link was sent to those
people who participated in the group with a description of the survey and a request to
participate. Convenience sampling systematically excluded some potential participants,
for example, those who do not subscribe to the Internet. This is known as selection bias,
or the tendency to exclude one type of unit. This can be a major drawback of convenience
sampling.

3.7 Sample Size

This number considered the application of a power analysis to detect an effect if
the effect is really there. Statistical power is the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true. The power analysis enabled a number
of participants to detect an effect size, or the magnitude of the effect of interest. The
factors for this power analysis were the confidence level of 95%, standard deviation of .5
and margin of error of +/-5. A prospective power analysis was performed using these
figures returns 385 participants needed. This study focused on medium size effects,
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which would determine strength of the relationship, or correlation, between the two
variables.
3.8 Tests/Instruments

The measures were a two-part survey (see Appendix). The first portion consisted
of questions that scored a user's knowledge of risk as determined by terms defined by the
researcher. These scores were measured in a five point Likert scale that ranged from
extremely unlikely to extremely likely. The second was a seven point Likert scale that
rated user comfort. The seven points were used to help dissuade "middle" answers. This
survey asked closed ended questions that assessed a user's comfort level in the use of
online medical data.

3.9 Variables

There were two variables of interest in this study. The independent variable was
the user's level of information security risk knowledge. The dependent variable was the
user's comfort level with utilizing online medical data. The researcher aimed to determine
a relationship between the two and if so, what direction the relationship was taking. This
was be done by using a 2-tailed t test. The 2 tailed t test takes half of the alpha to measure
one direction and half of the alpha to measure the other direction. Since the alpha, or
confidence interval, in this test was .5, the alpha was divided into .25 for each tail. This
measurement tested for a relationship in both directions.
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3.10 Assessment Instruments

The statistical software package SPSS was used to compute Cronbach's Alpha,
which is a measure of internal reliability. This measure was appropriate for Likert scales
to determine if the scales are consistent. SPSS also calculated the correlation analysis to
determine if any relationship existed between the two variables and if any were present,
which direction they may have taken. A two tailed t test was used to determine the means
of the two variables. A correlation analysis was used to determine how the variables vary
together.

3.11 Data Collection Methods

A two-part survey was used for this study. The first portion was a set of 19
questions that scored a user's knowledge of risk into a five point Likert scale. The second
portion was a seven point Likert survey that asked 13 closed ended questions about the
user's comfort level with their use of medically identifying data. The data collected were
the responses to the interval Likert questions given in each section. In addition, age and
gender responses were collected.

3.12 Analysis

The analysis was conducted to determine if there was a correlation between the
two variables and if so, what direction it may have taken. Testing the null hypothesis to
determine if there was a difference in a user's information security risk knowledge and
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their comfort level utilizing online medical data was the purpose of the analysis. The
correlation analysis was used to show if there was a positive or negative direction in the
data, in this case, if there was a positive or negative difference on a user's information
security risk knowledge with their utilization of online medical data. A Pearson's
correlation test was used to determine how well the two variables were related, or tested
the strength of a linear association between the two. The minimum score of r = .02 was
used as the threshold of interest. The analysis was further measured by gender and age of
the participants to determine if the correlation differs for these factors.
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CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter presents the results of the data collection and analysis. Data was
collected in relation to the issues presented in the previous chapters. Two areas of interest
were using a survey to measure a person's information security risk knowledge and their
level of comfort using online medical records. The purpose of the data collection was to
measure the correlation between information security risk knowledge and a person's
comfort level using online medical records. The data collected and processed from these
surveys were analyzed and the findings are presented in this chapter.

4.1 Analysis Statistics

Pearson's correlation was used to evaluate the null hypothesis that there is no
correlation between user's information security risk knowledge and their comfort using
online medical records (n=109). Results of the analysis yielded that there was no
statistically significant correlation between a user's information security risk knowledge
and their comfort using online medical records (r=0.132, df=107, p=0.169); correcting
for the reliabilities of the two scales, the estimated correlation was 0.170. The results
indicate that the evidence failed to reject the null hypothesis.
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4.2 Response Rate

The online survey software Qualtrics was used to prepare and administer the test.
The test was made publicly available after receiving IRB approval on February 25, 2015.
The test was accessed through a weblink placed inside an invitation posted to several
Purdue Alumni Facebook groups. The survey was made available for two weeks from
February 25 through March 14, 2015. A total of 121 responses were received during that
period. Of that number, 109 were fully completed (meaning both blocks one and two)
while 10 were partially completed (block one completed or partially completed while
block two was either partially or totally uncompleted). One survey was missing entirely.
With 109 useable surveys out of 120 total surveys returns a response rate of just over
90.8%.
The respondents were overwhelmingly female (68%), and over 55, with 46% of
the respondents in this age bracket.
Table 4.1 Age Breakdown of Participants
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Table 4.2 Gender Breakdown of Participants

4.3 Missing Data

Of the 121 surveys returned, 109 were fully completed, both block one, which
referenced information security risk knowledge, and block two, which referenced comfort
using online medical records. One survey was missing, and of the remaining 10 partially
completed, only three completed block one, either partially or completely. Of those three,
none completed block two. Since the block one respondents' mean responses did not
differ significantly in relation to the means for the 109 respondents with complete data,
the researcher chose to include them in the survey analysis. Allison (2002) discusses
how this can be justified by the non-block two respondents being generally not
statistically significant from those respondents who did answer block two. That missing
data from block two might be missing at random (where the missing data does not predict
missingness); they may instead be missing completely at random. If the responses in
block one were generally different, that would then mean that they would predict
missingness, and the data would not be missing at random.
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4.4 Correlation Analysis

While the overall correlation did not support the alternative hypothesis of this
thesis, there were statistically significant correlations within the matrix. Statistically
significant correlations were judged to be of practical interest if they were less than -0.2
or greater than 0.2. There are seven negative correlations between blocks one and two.
There were also 12 statistically significant (r>.2) positive correlations between blocks one
and two.
The strongest correlation involved question 33, which asked the respondent's
comfort sharing insurance credentials with a family member (refer to appendix). This
question gathered six of the seven (statistically significant and practically significant)
correlations between blocks one and two. Block one categorized information security risk
responses while block two responses categorized medical data comfort level. . This
question was asked in a recoded manner, meaning that it was asked so that the better
answer would be to respond in the opposite manner as the other questions. This coupled
with the ambiguous nature of the questions may indicate why it showed a heavy negative
correlation to some of the other questions. The respondents may have considered this to
be a question with a negative response rather than a positive, as was the case with the
surrounding questions.
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4.5 Reliability

Block 1 questions scored a Cronbach'a alpha of .66 with 17 questions. This
figure falls short of the .70 considered to be a quality score of reliability but can still be
useful.
The block 2 score was much higher at .92 measuring 13 questions. This showed
generally stronger correlations among the questions; respondents tended more to give
uniformly high or uniformly low ratings. The correlation between the two scales can be
corrected for attenuation (reliability). The low score form the first block of questions
would be most responsible for the attenuation.

4.6 Age and Gender Analysis

The reported differences between age and gender were notable on several
questions for each. The group above 55 showed responses which were more conservative
for three of the information security risk questions and one of the comfort level questions.
Independent samples t tests were analyzed to compare variability between the two groups.
The t tests shown in table 4.3 below, indicates that the above 55 group were more
cautious when accepting social media friend requests and less comfortable sharing
insurance information with family members. They were more likely than the under 55
age group to feel that they could determine a phishing attempt, and were more careful
opening email attachments sent by friends.
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Table 4.3 T Tests by Age

The differences between mean ratings from men and women is consistent across
most of the responses, with women reporting lower mean ratings than men; this persisted
across both blocks of the survey. The independent samples t tests, which compares
variability between the two groups, shows four questions which had statistically
significantly lower mean responses for women (α<.25). Women were more likely to
reuse passwords, participate in online contests, and were also less likely to feel
comfortable updating medical information online than men.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The original hypothesis sought to determine if there was a correlation between a
person's information security risk knowledge and their comfort using online medical
records. While there were multiple positive and negative correlations within the two
groups, the overall correlation was too small to reject the null hypothesis.

5.1 Limitations

While the survey results did not support the alternate hypothesis, several factors
could have affected the responses from the respondents, or their interpretation of the
questions. The questions were asked in two directions, that is, some questions were asked
if a higher score meant a better answer while others indicated a higher score was a less
desirable answer. These questions were mixed in the first block of questions. In the
second block of questions, there was only one question that was the opposite direction of
all the others, and that was the question that scored the most negative correlation between
the two blocks.
The reliability among the questions may have also had an impact on the survey
responses. Cronbach's alpha indicated that the variability among the first group was more
that the second block. This means that the second block of questions appears to be a more
consistent measure of the same information. In other words, it appears to have measured
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the data that the survey intended. The first block does not seem to share this reliability.
This may be due in part to the mixed direction of the questions in block one.
Time constraints also played a part in the collection of survey data. The time
between the Institutional Review Board permission and the thesis milestones was short,
not allowing for more data collection. While the respondents were sufficient to perform
data analysis, more responses and more varied respondents would have given the analysis
more statistical power.

5.2 Discussion

The strongest correlations were negative, which indicated that as the value for one
variable increased, the value for the other variable decreased. For these correlations, the
presence of one negatively impacted the other. While this was an interesting discovery, it
was opposite of what the researcher suspected may be true. The positive correlation for
information risk and comfort using financial data has been shown to be true (e.g. higher
levels of information security risk knowledge were associated with more comfort using
financial data online). This same correlation between the two study variables was the
primary factor for performing this study as well.
There were nine questions that were recoded as they were asked in an opposite
scale as the other questions. This means that if a positive response was a lower number,
these nine questions would then deem a higher response as positive. The presence of
these questions within the survey may have played a part in the lack of correlation as
participants may have been confused as to their direction of answer. It could have also

37
meant that participants were answering what they deemed a socially desirable answer,
meaning that they were answering the way they deemed the correct or positive response
desired by the researcher. The placement of these recoded questions could have mislead
participants to the nature of the question.
There was one question that garnered four of the seven negative correlations. That
question asked if a person felt comfortable sharing their insurance credentials with family
members. The researcher posed this as a potentially negative response question, meaning
that feeling more comfortable was a negative answer, and coded as such. The question
could have been viewed as being positive in that the family member may have been a
spouse, thereby potentially sharing insurance credentials, which the researcher did not
take into account.
While age and gender analysis were not part of the hypothesis, they were
variables of interest. The suspected outcome was that younger participants would be
more exposed to technology and its risks, and therefore more conservative with their
comfort level using online medical records due to this exposure. Since the correlation
between information security risk and comfort using online financial data has been shown,
the researcher suspected that younger participants would be more aware of information
security concerns in general, due to their increased potential of technology use in school
and personal use. What was reported, however, was that those over 55 reported more
conservative responses than those under 55. This means that the older respondents were
more cautious in their response to the information security concepts. It is difficult to
perform more in depth analysis of this phenomenon as the age groups are not consistently
represented, for example, there are only three men between 18-24 years, resulting in
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lower statistical power, meaning that the number of those participants may have been too
low to detect any differences. Women also reported lower information security risk
knowledge on four questions and less comfort on one medical record use question.
The respondent base was taken from Purdue Alumni groups, it may be assumed
that the respondents were educated and in the older age categories. An educated
respondent pool may be more knowledgeable, and savvy about internet use, and therefore
the risks associated with it. This could influence the older age group answering more
conservatively than the younger group.
The over 55 group may also be more exposed to online medical records because
they have more reason to be exposed to them through age related health issues. They may
simply be more experienced through necessity. The same could be said about insurance
attitudes. They may be more experienced through repetition and experience with medical
records and insurance companies in general, translating to comfort interacting with them
online. The experience level of a online medical record user and their comfort level using
insurance and medical data could be a valuable area of interest for medical data and
insurance stakeholders
Although the alternative hypothesis was not supported, there remains some
interesting conclusions that can be drawn from the survey. There were several
statistically significant correlations that were found between both age and gender groups
despite the lack of overall correlation in the survey. Future work that focuses on further
documenting the difference in information security risk knowledge and comfort between
men and women and those in different age groups, specifically those over 55 may be an
area of interest. One of the key finding of this survey is why did women score
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consistently lower mean scores that men across both information security risk knowledge
and comfort using online medical records? Work that seeks to determine what factors
could influence these lower scores would be a viable study.
Seeking to determine why those groups report different attitudes and behaviors
could provide a valuable insight for technology stakeholders. Determining why age and
gender plays a role in how a person interacts with technology, specifically online medical
data could be important, especially as the percentage of the population over 55 increases.
Insurance companies and other stakeholders that can gain a better understanding of how
their customers view and use their technology would be better able to then provide online
environments which enhances consumer understanding and participation.
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Appendix A
Survey Questions

Pt.1
1. Age
2. Gender
3. I use an anti virus program on my computer
Yes

No

Not sure

4. I have an anti spyware filter installed on my system
Yes

No

Not sure

The next set of questions will ask about your use of computer-based activities. How
likely are you to perform the following:
5.Keep your antivirus program updated
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

6. Open an email attachment sent by a friend
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

7. Download executable files
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

8. Install a found USB drive on my computer to see what it contained
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

9. Share my passwords with friends or family members
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

10. Click on a banner advertisement

Unlikely

Very Unlikely
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Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

11. Participate in online contests
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

12. Accept requests on social media from someone you don't know
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

13. Sign off your profile when you step away from your computer
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

14. Reuse passwords
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

15. Enable automatic software updates on my system
Very Likely

Likely Somewhat

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

The next set of questions will ask how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement
16. I do not access personal information over public networks
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
17. I feel that I can recognize a phishing attempt
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
18. I know how to determine if a network uses encryption
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
19. If I shop online, I ensure that the website uses encryption
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
20. My passwords are stored in a secure location
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
21. I do not click on links contained in an email

46
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
Codebook for answers
3-7 Antivirus/malware

18-19 Encryption

8-13 Security control

20. Passwords

14. Password

21. Identity theft

15-16 Security control
17. Identity theft
Part 2. Activities and Comfort level
1. Do you use a patient portal to access your medical records
Yes No
2. How many times have you visited a patient portal in the last 90 days?
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51+
On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being extremely uncomfortable and 7 being extremely
comfortable, please rate your level of comfort with the following activities
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely uncomfortable

Extremely comfortable

3. Communicating with your physician through the patient portal
4. Refilling prescriptions through the portal
5. Accessing medical tests through the portal
6. Updating medical information through the portal
7. Reviewing medical information through the portal
8. Accessing insurance information online
9. Reviewing explanation of benefits online
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10. Changing or updating insurance information online
11. Receiving insurance billing exclusively online
12. Sharing insurance credentials with a family member or friend
13. Registering for a medical procedure online
14. Paying a medical bill through the portal
15. Paying a medical insurance bill online.
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Appendix B
Statistical Charts

Figure B.1 Full Correlation Table
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Figure B.2 Group Statistics by Gender
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Figure B.3 Group Statistics by Age
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Figure B.4 T Tests by Gender
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Figure B.4 (continued)
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Figure B.4 (continued)
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Figure B.4 (continued)
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Figure B.5 T Tests by Age
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Figure B.5 (continued)

